Angry in the Great White North

From the Scotsman:

AN INCREASINGLY anxious UK government is closely monitoring a build-up of Argentinian military strength and a series of confrontations with the RAF close to the Falkland Islands, Scotland on Sunday can reveal.

The activity has led Tony Blair's most senior advisers to demand he issues a "hands-off" warning to Buenos Aires.

The sense of threat surrounding the Malvinas islands, regained from the Argentinian military junta in 1982, has been gathering for several months as President Nestor Kirchner's government has presided over an unprecedented revival in the strength of its air force - now at twice the strength it was during the 1982 conflict.

Several planes are believed to have overflown island airspace in a bid to test RAF defences. A number of Falkland vessels have been seized in waters close to Argentina.

The British have a garrison there, but it is small:

The British military presence in the South Atlantic has dropped from 1,900 troops in 1998 to 1,200 now, while 8,000 troops are deployed in Iraq and 3,000 are heading for Afghanistan. The Falklands garrison is dwarfed by the 20,000-strong British presence in Germany, the 10,000 in Northern Ireland and even 3,400 in Cyprus.

But critics warn that the garrison, which costs more than £110m a year, is hopelessly inadequate for fending off any renewed threat from abroad.

Well, their role is not to actually beat off an attack. The garrison is a tripwire -- an Argentinian attack would have to deal with the garrison, almost certainly resulting in the deaths of a significant number of British soldiers. That would compel a British response.

This has to give the Argentinian government reason to reconsider, which is exactly what the garrison's presence is supposed to accomplish.

But what of the Argentinian military buildup?

In recent years, the Argentinian air force has doubled in size, and is now the largest in South America. A major upgrade has fitted new missiles to Mirage fighters and Pucara ground-attack planes.

So it sounds like the Argentinian air force is a slightly spiffier version of the 1982 one. Though the Argentinian air force accounted for itself well in the war, far better than either the navy or the army (ironic, since of the three branches of the military, the air force leadership was the most against an invasion), the Argentinian air force was beaten off by British Royal Navy Harriers flying off small aircraft carriers, operating thousands of miles from any friendly land bases.

This time around, the British have land-based aircraft, including Tornados, on permanent rotation on the islands.

But besides the beefed up British miltary presence, including the advances in British technology since 1982 (advances I would be surprised if the Argentinians kept pace with), there are other differences between 1982 and 2006 that makes me think an invasion is unlikely.

In 1982, Britain had yet to be truly transformed by Margaret Thatcher. The country was still in comfortable decline, happy to be safe under the US nuclear umbrella. The Falklands War changed all that, of course. Since then, Great Britain went to war in the Gulf twice and in the Balkans. While other European nations dithered, Britain has taken the lead with the US in the Western struggle against tyranny and terror:

An Argentine soldier said: "If I had had real officers who were real men, maybe I would have stayed. No way! I'm Argentine and we aren't made for killing people. We like to eat, go to the movies, drink, and dance. We aren't like the English. They are professional soldiers--war is their business."

That quote was from 1982 -- the British have gotten only tougher since. But more than that -- with the unflinching support provided to the US over the last two decades, the Argentinians have to realize that the US will provide whatever support the British ask for in a war over the Falklands.

A bunch more Pucara ground attack planes suddenly don't seem so important.

One more thing. In 1982, Argentinian territory was never attacked (the Falklands don't count, of course). That was both a strategic decision to avoid escalating the conflict, as well as a tactical nod to the limits of British power projection. This time around, things might play out very differently on that front. If Britain is faced with having to fight the same war twice, they might decide that this will be not only the second time but also the last time. Argentina might be faced with some serious threats to its strategic military and economic assets over...what?...some wind-swept rocks and sheep?

With stand-off weapons of the kind that wreaked havoc inside Iraq launched from hundreds of miles away by submerged submarines, the Argentinians might discover that the explosion they trigger by stepping on the Falklands tripwire is far worse than they imagined.

One only hopes that the Argentinian strategists aren't expecting to have a replay of 1982. They'd be fools to think that all they need to do is have more airplanes this time around. The British aren't stupid. If the Argentinians have more planes, the British will change the nature of the war so that the number of airplanes you have don't matter.