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    <title>Steve Janke: Angry in the Great White North: Comments for "Being the OSC means never having to say you&apos;re sorry"</title>
    <link>http://stevejanke.com/archives/200677.php</link>
    <description>Comments for the entry "Being the OSC means never having to say you&apos;re sorry"</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Sat, 14 Oct 2006 20:49:50 -05:00</lastBuildDate>
     <item>
      <title>Comment from Jay</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Isn't the Canadian legal system here sending a basic message that if you invest in Canada you're a complete fool because we can decide anything against you that we feel like?</p>]]></description>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Oct 2006 20:49:50 -05:00</pubDate>
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<lastBuildDate>Sun, 15 Oct 2006 06:19:15 -05:00</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Comment from murray</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Curial deference is not a fresh development in Canadian administrative law. It even applies on an appeal of a superior court trial decision with respect to findings of fact. An appeal has never been a hearing de novo. There is a difference between the just outcome, and the "right" outcome from some idealized transcendental perspective of hindsight. The concern of the OSC ruling was to protect smaller investors from colateral benefits going to big players in transactions--evidently the courts are going to give the OSC leeway to develop that policy in its decisions. The rationale is that OSC commissioners probably have a better intuition for ways of scamming collateral benefits (or opportunities that rulings might create for future transactions) than a court. Would you prefer the likes of Justice Abella deciding these things? Be careful what you wish for.</p>]]></description>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Oct 2006 06:19:15 -05:00</pubDate>
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<lastBuildDate>Sun, 15 Oct 2006 15:24:07 -05:00</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Comment from </title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><i>The rationale is that OSC commissioners probably have a better intuition for ways of scamming collateral benefits (or opportunities that rulings might create for future transactions) than a court.</i></p>

<p>I don't think that the people in the OSC have any special ability - or incentive - to sniff out fraud and corruption in publicly traded companies.  If your broker failed to help you recognize a bad investment, you would very quickly fire him by pulling your remaining investments.  But if the OSC failed to protect investors (*cough* Bre-X), you know what happens: no one at the OSC would be fired or demoted.  But the people who screwed up would demand more money and greater powers - and they would receive them.  The screwups will be promoted to higher authority within the new, expanded organization, and will soon get to work teaching their new underlings everything they know (about expanding an unaccountable bureaucracy at the expense of taxpayers and investors).</p>

<p><i> Would you prefer the likes of Justice Abella deciding these things?</i></p>

<p>Er, no, I think that investors themselves (and the brokers and analysts whom they hire) are pretty well able to sort out which companies and entrepreneurs are crooked, and which ones are honest.  Especially once they rid themselves of the idea that government is their Daddy.<br />
</p>]]></description>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Oct 2006 15:24:07 -05:00</pubDate>
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